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Back to the Basics: Leaving the Hanging Paragraph Hanging
Nicholas M. Hudalla*
"A ready way to lose your friend is to lend him money. Another
equally ready way to lose him is to refuse to lend him money. It is
six of one and a half dozen of the other."
-George Jean Nathan
I. INTRODUCTION
Strongly resembling the concept of jus in bello,' the Bankruptcy
Code dictates the acceptable practices in the creditor/debtor financial
war. However, unlike a true combat situation, under the Bankruptcy
Code, each class of participants in a bankruptcy proceeding is guided
and limited by its own unique set of standards. Once these standards
are drawn, or amended, a creditor's right to strike is molded by the
hands of our judicial system. Like the jus ad bellum,2 the nation is
often split as to whether certain hostilities are justified. Consequently,
one jurisdiction may provide a creditor with modernized artillery
while a neighboring jurisdiction heavily restrains the acceptable credi-
tor practices.
In 2005, Congress amended 11 U.S.C. § 1325 ("Section 1325") ad-
ding an unnumbered paragraph below Section 1325(a). This para-
graph has commonly been referred to as the "hanging paragraph." In
relevant part, this hanging paragraph restricts the applicability of 11
U.S.C. § 506 ("Section 506") with respect to a creditor who: (1) has a
purchase-money security interest securing the debt that is the subject
of the claim; (2) is owed a debt incurred within a 910-day period pre-
ceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition; and (3) has a security in-
terest in a motor vehicle for personal use. 3 After the adoption of this
amendment, judiciaries in the majority of jurisdictions provided credi-
* B.S.: Political Science, 2005, Roosevelt University; J.D. Candidate, May 2009, DePaul Uni-
versity College of Law. I would like to thank my family and friends for their generosity, motiva-
tion, and support throughout all of my academic endeavors.
1. See David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Methods of the "War on Terror," 16 MINN. J. INT'L
L. 371, 371 (2007) (defining jus in bello as "the limits on the methods of war").
2. See Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: A Rational
Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1843 (2007) (defining the jus ad
bellum as "the decision whether engaging in hostilities is justified").
3. 11 U.S.C § 1325(a) (2007).
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tors with a combative entitlement, granting a "910-day creditor" 4 with
full authority to thwart a debtor's attempt to bifurcate a 910-day claim
into a secured and unsecured portion. 5
This article will argue that a fair reading of the hanging paragraph
indicates that the paragraph's language lays the framework for a more
passive, pro-debtor interpretation of the Code. Part II of this article
discusses the flawed majority interpretation of the hanging paragraph,
which acts to bar application of Section 506 to a 910-day claim while
finding secured status through the application of state law. 6 Part III
clarifies the majority's misinterpretation of Dewsnup v. Timm and,
even more importantly, of Section 506.7 Finally, Part IV emphasizes
that although the Eastern District of Louisiana created a solid frame-
work for applying secured status to a 910-day claim, this jurisdiction
failed to give full effect to the hanging paragraph's limitations on a
910-day creditor's rights.8
II. THE MAJORITY VIEW
In 1989, in United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., the United
States Supreme Court expressly stated that "Section 506 ... governs
the definition and treatment of secured claims." 9 In 2006, the majority
of the circuit courts broadly applied the newly adopted hanging para-
graph, finding that Section 506 no longer applied to 910-day claims.' 0
4. In re Murray, 352 B.R. 340, 351 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006).
5. See id. at 350 (stating that claims under the hanging paragraph cannot be bifurcated into
secured and unsecured claims); In re Johnson, 337 B.R. 269, 272 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. 2006) (as-
serting that a 910-day creditor is entitled to the full claim or the return of the vehicle); In re
Bufford, 343 B.R. 827, 831 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (stating, "No doubt, the drafters of the 910-
day provision intended to eliminate the ability of debtors to bifurcate, or 'strip down' secured
claims on these recently purchased vehicles."); In re Montgomery, 341 B.R. 843, 845 (Bankr.
E.D. Ky. 2006) (providing that a court may not confirm a debtor's confirmation plan providing
for the bifurcation of a 910-day claim); In re Fleming, 339 B.R. 716, 722 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2006)
(asserting that bifurcation over an undersecured 910-day creditor's objection is impermissible);
In re Vega, 344 B.R. 616, 620 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006) (entitling the creditor to the underlying
value of the claim under applicable state law).
6. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 415 (1992); see infra Part II.
7. In re White, 352 B.R. 633 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2006); see infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. 489 U.S. 235, 238-39 (1989).
10. See In re Brooks, 344 B.R. 417, 421 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 2006) ("a 910 claim may be an
'allowed secured claim'.. . regardless of the inapplicability of § 506"); In re Duke, 345 B.R. 806,
809 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2006) ("the 'hanging paragraph' clearly states that § 506 does not apply to
910 vehicles"); In re Rowley, 348 B.R. 479, 481 (Bankr. S.D. In. 2006) (stating that if the four
elements of the hanging paragraph are met, "Section 506 shall not apply to a claim"); In re
Trejos, 352 B.R. 249, 253 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006) ("the hanging paragraph treats certain cars
differently by exempting them from Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code"); In re Horn, 338 B.R.
110, 113 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2006) ("The current law, however, prevents the application of
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Combining this broad application with the asserted purpose of Section
506 would seemingly create the simplistic effect of removing secured
status from 910-day claims. This simplicity, however, was shunned by
the same courts that created the broad application. Instead, these
courts adopted the theory that Section 506 is not a definitional provi-
sion, and, therefore, it is not the basis for secured status.1
As this anti-definitional approach directly contradicts Justice Black-
mun's assertion in Ron Pair,12 the courts needed to find a way to ma-
neuver around Ron Pair. This maneuvering came through heavy
reliance on Dewsnup v. Timm.13 In Dewsnup, the debtor filed for
Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 14 The debtor's assets included real property,
valued at $39,000, which was used to secure an approximately
$120,000 loan.15 Relying on Section 506(a), the debtor asserted that
she was able to cram down this debt into a secured portion of $39,000
and an unsecured portion of $81,000.16 The debtor then looked to Sec-
tion 506(d) and asserted the $81,000 unsecured portion was not an
allowed secured claim, and therefore that the court should void this
portion, ultimately stripping down the lien to the $39,000 secured
claim. 17
In response to the complaint, the creditors, joined by the United
States as amicus curiae, argued against stripping down liens through
Section 506(d). 18 To support this argument, the creditors relied on leg-
islative history reflecting the intent to retain the pre-Code bankruptcy
law which preserved creditors' liens beyond discharge' 9 (the "pass-
through rule").20 The creditors asserted that Section 506(a) is not defi-
nitional, and therefore, the allowed secured claim referenced in Sec-
tion 506(d) is not an indivisible term of art with respect to the allowed
secured claim referenced in Section 506(a). 21 With the "pass-through
rule" as a backdrop, the creditors then urged the Court to define a
§ 506"); Fleming, 339 B.R. at 722 (stating that according to the language of the hanging para-
graph, Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply to 910-day creditors).
11. See, e.g., Brooks, 344 B.R. at 421 (asserting that § 506(a) is a method of valuing an allowed
secured claim, it is not a definitional provision).
12. Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 238-39.
13. 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
14. Id. at 413.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 415-16.
19. Id. at 416.
20. See MICHAEL J. HERBERT, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 208-09 (1995) (explaining the
"pass-through rule"); see also infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
21. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 415. In other words, the allowed secured claim referenced in Section
506(a) is not necessarily identical to the allowed secured claim referenced in Section 506(d).
2009]
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Section 506(d) allowed secured claim in two phases: (1) whether it is
"allowed" under 11 U.S.C. § 502 ("Section 502"); and (2) whether the
claim is "secured" by a state law lien.22 This piecemeal analysis would
ensure preservation of the "pass-through rule." A claim against the
debtor personally could be crammed down within the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding under Section 506(a) by allocating secured status to the value
of the collateral and allocating unsecured status to the excess debt.23
Furthermore, a claim outside of bankruptcy against the debtor's prop-
erty (a state law lien) would be unaffected by the bankruptcy proceed-
ing as Section 506(d) would prohibit stripping down the lien by
ensuring that the entire claim would retain status as an allowed se-
cured claim outside of the bankruptcy proceeding.24
The Court asserted that there were difficulties in the creditor's anal-
ysis, but relying heavily on the Congressional intent to preserve the
"pass-through rule," the Court refused to permit the debtor's strip
down technique.25 The Court reasoned that Section 506(d) did not
permit the debtor to strip down the claim because the debt was se-
cured by a lien and allowed pursuant to Section 502.26
Through a great deal of judicial craftsmanship, numerous courts
have vastly manipulated this narrow Dewsnup analysis and created
the answer to the roadblock imposed by Ron Pair on a 910-day credi-
tor's secured status.27 These courts assert that under Dewsnup, Sec-
tion 506 is not definitional; 28 however, because of the "pass-through
rule," state law defines the secured status of bankruptcy claims.29
Therefore, although under a broad application of the hanging para-
graph the majority of circuit courts assert that Section 506 does not
apply to 910-day claims, under this interpretation, a 910-day claim re-
tains secured status in a bankruptcy proceeding through state law. 30
22. Id.
23. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2007).
24. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 416; 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (2007).
25. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417 (asserting that "respondents' alternative position, espoused also
by the United States, although not without its difficulty, generally is the better of the several
approaches.") (emphasis added).
26. Id. Ultimately, this holding focused primarily on adopting the two phase analysis under
Section 506(d) proposed by the creditors.
27. U.S. v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 238-39 (1989).
28. See, e.g., In re Brooks, 344 B.R. 417, 421 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 2006).
29. See, e.g., In re Shaw, 341 B.R. 543, 546 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. 2006) ("creditor's secured status
is dictated by state law while the treatment of secured claims is dictated by the Bankruptcy
Code").
30. See, e.g., In re Trejos, 352 B.R. 249, 263 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006) (stating that creditors with
liens on estate property remain secured, the hanging paragraph simply affects the amount to be
paid to these creditors).
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III. BEYOND THE NARROW DEWSNUP HOLDING AND
INTO THE DEPTHS OF THE CODE
A. Distinguishing "Allowed Secured Claims"
In Dewsnup, the Court made clear it was not taking on a full-scale
adoption of the creditors' analysis. 31 Rather than outline these diffi-
culties, however, the Dewsnup Court focused strictly on the need to
preserve the "pass-through rule."' 32 Therefore, the Court presented an
oversimplified analysis of the significance of Section 506. However, by
developing a thorough understanding of the "pass-through rule," Sec-
tion 506, and Dewsnup, it becomes abundantly clear how limited the
Dewsnup holding truly is. Dewsnup in no way asserts, or even implies,
that Section 506 is a non-definitional provision.33
First, it is essential to understand the "pass-through rule." The rule
focuses on the lien beyond discharge, beyond the bankruptcy proceed-
ing.34 Upon a bankruptcy petition's expiration, unsatisfied obligations
are discharged-the obligations cease to be binding on the debtor per-
sonally.3 5 Thus, upon discharge, a creditor loses the right to proceed
against a debtor personally.36 However, if a trustee abandons property
and the creditor bypasses the bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor re-
tains possession of, and title to, the property.37 In this circumstance,
the "pass-through rule" is implicated. Although the unsatisfied obliga-
tions are not binding on the debtor personally, the lien passes through
the bankruptcy proceeding unaffected. The creditor retains rights
against the debtor's property, and the creditor is entitled to foreclose
on the asset.38 As provided by Michael J. Herbert, "what survives the
bankruptcy is the lien, not the secured claim. '39
The next step is analyzing Section 506 in general terms. The sim-
plest way to conceptualize Section 506 is to consider the specific ele-
ments of subsections (a) and (d) and define how each can be satisfied.
Section 506(a) is comprised of two elements. The first, "an allowed
claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate
31. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417 (stating that the creditors' position, "although not without its
difficulties, generally is the better of the several approaches.")
32. Id.
33. Furthermore, it is evident that the Dewsnup holding does not rely on state law to define
secured status during the bankruptcy proceeding.
34. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 208.
35. Id. at 207.
36. See id.
37. In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1995); HERBERT, supra note 20, at 208.
38. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 208.
39. Id. at 208.
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has an interest, °40 will be referred to as the "lien-liability element."
The lien-liability element is satisfied (the claim is an allowed secured
claim) 41 if the claim is allowed under Section 50242 and is secured by a
lien on the debtor's property.43 Consequently, the lien-liability ele-
ment is not satisfied (the claim is not an allowed secured claim) if the
claim is either disallowed under Section 502 or the claim is not se-
cured by a lien on the debtor's property.
The second element of Section 506(a) is encompassed within the
following text:
[a]n allowed claim.., is a secured claim to the extent of the value of
such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property...
and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such credi-
tor's interest ... is less than the amount of such allowed claim. 44
This element, which will be referred to as the "personal-liability ele-
ment," only arises if the lien-liability element is satisfied. 45 If so, the
value of the creditor's interest and the value of the property at issue
must be determined. 46 If the property at issue has retained value, the
creditor's claim is allocated secured status to this extent, 47 and the
personal-liability element is satisfied (the claim is an allowed secured
claim). Then, after subtracting the property value from the creditor's
interest, the remaining value is allocated unsecured status;48 therefore,
to this extent, the personal-liability element is unsatisfied (the claim is
not an allowed secured claim).
40. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2007).
41. It is important to note that the basis for breaking down Sections 506(a) and (d) into sepa-
rate elements derives from the assertion in Dewsnup that the use of the phrase "allowed secured
claim" is not an indivisible term of art. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 415 (1992).
42. In re White, 352 B.R. 633, 643 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2006) ("Under § 502, the allowed claim is
calculated by taking the sums due as of the petition date, and specifically excluding unmatured
interest or unaccrued other charges due under the contract or state law. If a claim is not other-
wise subject to objection, the claim is allowed").
43. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2007) (requiring that the claim is "secured by a lien on property in
which the estate has an interest").
44. Id. § 506(a).
45. White, 352 B.R. at 643 (asserting that a claim can only be deemed secured for the purposes
of bankruptcy if the claim is allowed and secured by a valid lien that is attached to property of
the estate) (emphasis added).
46. It is important to note that the creditor and debtor will undertake different approaches to
determine the value of creditor's interest and the property at issue. See Stacey L. Molison, A
Look at Disparate Approaches to Valuation under Section 506 and its Relationship to Section
1325, 15 ABI L. REV. 659, 659-60 (2007). Ultimately, the bankruptcy court will make the final
determination; however, differing jurisdictions apply differing approaches. Id.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (stating that the claim "is a secured claim to the extent of the value
of [the] creditor's interest in the estate's interest in [the] property").
48. Id. (asserting that the claim "is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of [the]
creditor's interest ... is less than the amount of [the] allowed claim").
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Section 506(d) contains only one element, "a lien secur[ing] a claim
against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim."' 49 This com-
ponent, which will be referred to as the "voidance element," allows a
debtor to avoid a creditor's lien if the lien secures an interest but the
claim is not allowed under Section 502.50 In other words, this element
cannot be used to void a lien if the lien secures a claim which is al-
lowed under Section 502.51 Therefore, the voidance element is satis-
fied (the claim is an allowed secured claim) if the claim is allowed
under Section 502, and the claim is secured by a lien on the debtor's
property. Furthermore, the voidance element is unsatisfied (the claim
is not an allowed secured claim) if the claim is either disallowed under
Section 502 or not secured by a lien on the debtor's property.52
The next step is to apply this Section 506 breakdown to the Court's
oversimplified analysis of the hanging paragraph in Dewsnup. In Dew-
snup, the debtor was trying to strip down the creditor's claim. 53 In
accordance with the element terminology, the debtor asserted that the
unsecured portion of the creditor's claim meant the personal-liability
element was not satisfied, and therefore, the unsecured portion was
not an allowed secured claim.54 Furthermore, the debtor asserted that
the allowed secured claim referenced under the personal-liability ele-
ment is analogous to the allowed secured claim under the voidance
element.55 Thus, the debtor argued that because the unsecured por-
tion was unsatisfied with respect to the personal-liability element, the
unsecured portion was also unsatisfied with respect to the voidance
element and could be stripped down and voided.56
Without much analysis, the Court disagreed with the debtor's inter-
pretation.57 As asserted by the debtor, analogizing the allowed se-
cured claim of the personal-liability element with that of the voidance
element would effectively strip the value of the unsatisfied (un-
secured) portion of the personal-liability element from the creditor's
lien.58 Heavily relying on its intent to preserve the state-law lien, the
Court refused to analogize the personal-liability element to the void-
49. Id. § 506(d).
50. In re Shandrew, 210 B.R. 829, 832 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1997).
51. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992).
52. Satisfaction of this element is noticeably similar to satisfaction of the lien liability element.
53. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 413.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 417 (providing the debtor's assertion that "the words 'allowed secured claim' must
take the same meaning in § 506(d) as in § 506(a)").
56. Id. at 414.
57. Id. at 417.
58. Id.
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ance element.59 The Court stressed that such an analogy would in-
fringe on the congressional intent to preserve the "pass-through
rule."'60 Accordingly, an allowed secured claim under the personal-lia-
bility element is not equivalent to an allowed secured claim under the
voidance element.
By firmly establishing the need to retain the "pass-through rule,"
the Dewsnup Court enforced the impermissibility of analogizing the
allowed secured claim under the personal-liability element with the
allowed secured claim under the voidance element.61 As noted above,
the "pass-through rule" focuses on the lien outside of bankruptcy. 62
Consequently, Dewsnup stands for the proposition that the personal-
liability element is restricted from affecting the "pass-through rule, '63
and accordingly, the personal-liability element is restricted from limit-
ing the lien outside of bankruptcy. 64 Thus, the effectiveness of the per-
sonal-liability element is narrow-it is only permitted to affect the
status of claims inside the bankruptcy proceeding. The effectiveness of
the voidance element is broader because its purpose is to preserve the
"pass-through rule," 65 so its effectiveness is focused on retaining the
status of the lien outside of the bankruptcy proceeding. 66 Upon de-
lineating these limitations, however, the Dewsnup Court did not com-
pare the lien-liability and voidance elements.
By comparing the scope of the three elements under Section 506, it
becomes clear that the allowed secured claim referenced under the
lien-liability and the voidance elements are analogous. As Dewsnup
established, the scope of the voidance element has a broader basis
than the personal-liability element. Furthermore, it is clear from the
text of Section 506(a) that the personal-liability element only arises if
the lien-liability element is satisfied. 67 When the lien-liability element
is satisfied, however, the personal-liability element effectively divides
the lien-liability element into two parts to place a limit on one portion
of the lien-liability element within the bankruptcy proceeding.68
59. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 208.
63. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417.
64. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 208.
65. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417.
66. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 207.
67. In re White, 352 B.R. 633, 643 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2006) (asserting that a claim can only be
deemed secured for the purposes of bankruptcy if the claim satisfies the lien liability elements, it
is allowed and secured by a valid lien that is attached to property of the estate).
68. In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 2000) ("Section 506 allows bifurcation of
claims into secured and unsecured components").
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Therefore, because the personal-liability element acts as a divider
within the context of a lien-liability element, the lien-liability element
is broader than the personal-liability element.
By considering the two broad elements-lien-liability and void-
ance-it becomes apparent that the requirements to satisfy the ele-
ments are identical. Pursuant to the Dewsnup analysis, the allowed
secured claim under the voidance element refers to preserving secured
status outside of bankruptcy after the claim has been allowed in to the
bankruptcy proceeding.69 To satisfy this element, the claim must be
permissible under Section 502 and it must be secured by a lien on the
debtor's property. 70 To satisfy the lien-liability element, the claim
must be allowed under Section 502 and it must be secured by a lien on
the debtor's property.71 Thus, the voidance element and the lien-lia-
bility element have the same satisfaction requirements. The inevitable
consequence of this is that if one allowed secured claim exists, the
other must exist; if one does not exist, the other cannot exist. Conse-
quently, the allowed secured claim under the voidance element is
analogous to the allowed secured claim under the lien-liability ele-
ment and not the personal-liability element as asserted by the debtor
in Dewsnup.72
Ultimately, the only difference between the voidance element and
the lien-liability element is the purpose of each. Under Section 506(a),
the personal-liability element is not implicated unless the lien-liability
element is met; thus, the latter acts as a gatekeeper regulating whether
a claim may enter a bankruptcy proceeding. 73 Under Section 506(d),
however, the purpose of the voidance element is to preserve the
"pass-through rule," so this element regulates the lien post-bank-
ruptcy.74 Together the allowed secured claims under the lien-liability
element and the voidance element regulate the status of the claim at
the entrance and the exit of the bankruptcy proceeding. The personal-
liability element is not implicated until after the claim enters by satis-
fying the lien-liability element,75 and it is restricted from having an
effect beyond the bankruptcy proceeding due to the voidance ele-
69. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
70. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417.
71. White, 352 B.R. at 643 (explaining that Section 502 provides for a claims allowance, and
stating that Section 506 assumes that the claim is allowed and secured by a valid lien).
72. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417.
73. White, 352 B.R. at 643 ("Section 506 begins by assuming that the claim has been allowed
and is secured by a valid lien. It then requires that the lien attach to property of the estate. Only
in this event is the claim deemed a 'secured claim' for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code").
74. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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ment.76 Therefore, the allowed secured claim under the personal-lia-
bility element covers the ground between the lien-liability element
and the voidance element. Consequently, the personal-liability ele-
ment regulates the status of the claim during the bankruptcy
proceeding.
Courts in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Cir-
cuits have relied on elements of Dewsnup to assert that secured status
in a bankruptcy proceeding is dictated by state law. 77 Relying on state
law to define secured status spawns from a clearly fictitious assess-
ment in Dewsnup that undermines the value of Section 506. Two types
of secured claims are permissible under Section 506: (1) the allowed
secured claim relied on to construct the lien-liability element and the
voidance element; and (2) the allowed secured claim relied on to con-
struct the personal-liability element.78 In Dewsnup, the Court simply
created a distinction within the ambiguousness of the term "allowed
secured claim. ' '79 In doing so, the Court merely established that: (1)
the allowed secured claim under the voidance element is distinct from
that under the personal-liability element; and (2) the voidance ele-
ment focuses on the status of the claim outside of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding.80 Based on Dewsnup, the corollary of this delineation is that
the allowed secured claim under the personal-liability element must
be restricted to the bankruptcy proceeding. 81 This distinction, how-
ever, provides no basis to assert that state law defines the secured sta-
tus of a claim within a bankruptcy proceeding. Rather, when
considering the status of a claim inside a bankruptcy proceeding, one
must directly consult the personal-liability element because-as as-
serted in Ron Pair-Section 506, and more specifically the personal-
76. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
77. See In re Brooks, 344 B.R. 417, 422 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 2006) (citations omitted) ("the
'determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate' is left to state law"); In re
Bufford, 343 B.R. 827, 832 (Bankr. N.D. Tex 2006) ("A claim ... determined to be either 'se-
cured' or not pursuant to state law"); In re Duke, 345 B.R. 806, 809 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2006)
("The determination of property rights in assets of a bankrupt estate is left to state law."); In re
Zehrung, 351 B.R. 675, 677 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2006) (citations omitted) ("The 'determination of
property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate' is left to state law."); In re Fleming, 339 B.R.
716, 724 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2006) (The creditors "argue that state law defines their rights. This is
true."); In re Henry, 353 B.R. 261, 263 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006) (citations omitted) ("The 'determi-
nation of property rights in assets of a bankrupt's estate' is left to state law.").
78. See 11 U.S.C § 506(a) and (d) (2007).
79. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 423 (1992) (asserting that it will not rely on "ambiguous"
text to change the meaning of the pass-through rule).
80. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
81. As noted above, the lien liability element regulates entrance into the bankruptcy proceed-
ing, and the voidance element regulates beyond bankruptcy; therefore, the personal-liability ele-
ment regulates during the bankruptcy proceeding.
[Vol. 7:357
LEAVING THE HANGING PARAGRAPH HANGING
liability element, defines the secured status of a claim within a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, not state law. 2
B. Dewsnup Was Filed Under Chapter 7, Not Chapter 13
As noted by the bankruptcy court in In re White, Dewsnup involved
a Chapter 7 issue; however, the hanging paragraph is a Chapter 13
provision.8 3 Chapter 7 is the platform for liquidation. In accordance
with the process of Chapter 7, "individuals relinquish all their nonex-
empt assets, as of the date of the bankruptcy petition, to a bankruptcy
trustee. ' 84 Chapter 13, on the other hand, relies on a "pay out" con-
cept in which the debtor is entitled to retain its assets, but in exchange,
must commit a portion of its postpetition income to the payment of
prepetition debts.8 5 This Chapter 13 process is referred to as
reorganization.
Because a Chapter 7 debtor relinquishes non-exempt property
through liquidation and a Chapter 13 debtor retains property as it en-
ters reorganization, each claim requires a different analysis. Further-
more, Chapter 7 cases are generally inapplicable to the analysis in a
Chapter 13 case.86 Thus, under most circumstances, a Chapter 7 hold-
ing has no place in the examination of a Chapter 13 provision such as
the hanging paragraph. There are, however, two circumstances in
which a Chapter 7 debtor retains property-reaffirmation 87 and re-
demption.88 These procedures are comparable to a Chapter 13 reor-
ganization plan.
Reaffirmation and redemption arise almost exclusively when an as-
set is either exempt from liquidation under 11 U.S.C. § 522 ("Section
522") or it is abandoned by the trustee. 9 Section 522 exemptions,
however, have no impact on a 910-day creditor's rights. A debtor may
claim a limited motor vehicle exemption, not exceeding $3,225 in an
82. U.S. v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 238-39 (1989).
83. See In re White, 352 B.R. 633, 642 n. 19 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2006); see also Dewsnup, 502
U.S. at 413.
84. RAYMOND T. NIMMER, ET AL., COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: SECURED FINANCING
CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 255 (3d ed. 2003).
85. Id. at 258.
86. In re DeSimone, 21 B.R. 631, 632 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1982).
87. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 228-31 (explaining reaffirmation).
88. Id. at 203-05 (explaining redemption).
89. Id. ("To be eligible for redemption, the property must either be exempt under section 522
or must have been abandoned by the trustee to the lienholder"); Id. at 230 ("reaffirmation
agreements are used almost exclusively as a way of allowing the debtor to keep encumbered
property that would otherwise be lost to the creditors").
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automobile; 90 however, a creditor with a valid lien is entitled to en-
force this lien before the debtor is entitled to invoke this exemption. 91
Therefore, a debtor can only retain possession of a vehicle through
redemption or a reaffirmation agreement if the trustee abandons the
property. In Chapter 7, a trustee will abandon property if it is encum-
bered, meaning that the property's value is less than the debt owed on
it.92 Consequently, a Chapter 7 holding could rationally play a role in
a Chapter 13 hanging paragraph analysis when the property is encum-
bered and the debtor has reaffirmed or redeemed the debt. However,
neither occurrence places a limitation on the definitional status of Sec-
tion 506.
A reaffirmation agreement entitles a debtor to retain property in
exchange for his agreement to pay off a debt over a specified period of
time. 93 Facially, this arrangement appears comparable to a Chapter 13
reorganization plan, but courts analyze Chapter 7 reaffirmation agree-
ments in a unique way.
An effective reaffirmation agreement requires the creditor and
debtor to enter a valid contract in which both parties mutually assent
to its terms.94 A reaffirmation agreement is unlike a Chapter 13 reor-
ganization plan because under Chapter 13, the creditor generally plays
no role in forming the plan.95 Under reaffirmation, the parties work
together to modify the terms of the agreement;96 under reorganiza-
tion, the debtor develops the reorganization plan under bankruptcy
law guidelines. 97 The significance of this distinct reaffirmation con-
tract requirement is critical to the development of reaffirmation
analysis.
11 U.S.C. § 524 ("Section 524") regulates the validity of a reaffirma-
tion agreement. 98 However, once Section 524 is satisfied, the agree-
ment is considered a contract. 99 At this point, the valid reaffirmation
agreement is pulled outside of bankruptcy analysis and state law gov-
90. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2) (2007) (a vehicle owner is only entitled to exempt a value not
exceeding $3,225 in one motor vehicle).
91. CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, BANKRUPTCY LAW: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND
PRACTICE 654 (2d ed. 2006).
92. NIMMER, supra note 84, at 255.
93. In re Buck, 331 B.R. 322, 324 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) ("a reaffirmation may be paid over
time, as opposed to a one lump-sum payment which is required when redeeming property").
94. In re Turner, 156 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 1998).
95. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 358.
96. In re Hasek, No. 96 B 23346, 1997 WL 1050829, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
97. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 358 ("the contents of the plan are almost entirely set by the
statutory requirements for confirmation").
98. In re Daniel, 290 B.R. 914, 920 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2003).
99. Hasek, 1997 WL 1050829, at *3.
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erns. 0 0 The court's role is no longer to define a bankruptcy claim, but
rather to interpret a contract. 1°1 In this situation, neither Section 506
nor any other bankruptcy provision is relevant because the bank-
ruptcy court's role in defining a bankruptcy claim is unnecessary.
10 2
Therefore, it is impermissible to rely on a Chapter 7 reaffirmation
analysis to assert Section 506 does not define the secured status of a
bankruptcy claim because a valid reaffirmation agreement does not
involve a "bankruptcy claim"-it involves a contract governed by
state law.
A Chapter 7 debtor may also retain possession of property through
redemption. According to Michael Herbert, "redemption simply
means that the debtor may buy out the lien and thus become the
owner of the property.' 10 3 A debtor considering redemption may initi-
ate the process by filing a notice of intent to redeem with the court.
10 4
In some instances, the debtor and creditor will agree on the price to
buy out the lien.105 If a disagreement arises, bankruptcy courts will
step in to settle the differences.' 0 6 In doing so, the court will require
the debtor to pay the amount of the "allowed secured claim.' 0 7 As
noted above, the phrase "allowed secured claim" can refer to: (1) the
lien at the entrance or exit of the bankruptcy proceeding, as it does in
the context of the lien-liability and voidance elements;10 8 or (2) the
secured status of a claim within the bankruptcy proceeding as it does
in the context of the personal-liability element. 0 9 Accordingly, with
respect to Section 506, the redemption process requires determining
which allowed secured claim is referenced in 11 U.S.C. § 722 ("Sec-
tion 722").
The allowed secured claim referenced in Section 722 is equal to the
fair market value of the collateral at issue. t 1° The only value referred
to by the allowed secured claim created under the lien-liability ele-
100. In re Gitlitz, 127 B.R. 397, 400 (Bankr. S.D. Oh. 1991) (asserting that matters beyond the
reaffirmation agreement are "clearly within the province of the state court").
101. Id. at 400 (asserting that bankruptcy court involvement ceases beyond Section 525(c) and
(d)).
102. Id. at 400 ("It was contemplated that disputes between parties to reaffirmation agree-
ments would take place in non-bankruptcy courts using non-bankruptcy law.").
103. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 203.
104. Id. at 205.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 11 U.S.C. § 722 (2007).
108. See supra notes 72-74.
109. See supra note 74.
110. In re Bell, 700 F.2d 1053, 1055 n.3 (6th Cir. 1983).
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ment and the voidance element is that of the original lien."' There-
fore, the allowed secured claim of the lien-liability element and the
voidance element can be equated to the fair market value of the col-
lateral when the value of the collateral and the value of the original
lien are equal. However, this will only occur in rare occasions given
that the fair market value of the collateral fluctuates, while the lien is
stagnant. Because this allowed secured claim does not fluctuate with
the fair market value of the collateral, these values cannot be gener-
ally classified as equal. Thus, the allowed secured claim referenced in
Section 722 does not refer to the allowed secured claim encompassed
by the lien-liability element and the voidance element.
Since the allowed secured claim referenced by these elements is
clearly not the Section 722 allowed secured claim, one can rationally
expect that Section 722 concerns the allowed secured claim embraced
by the personal-liability element. Analyzing the personal-liability ele-
ment, confirms this expectation. Section 506(a) encompasses the per-
sonal-liability element under the phrase, "[a]n allowed claim ... is a
secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in
the estate's interest in such property ... and is an unsecured claim to
the extent that the value of such creditor's interest ... is less than the
amount of such allowed claim. 11 2 This text has been interpreted to
allow the debtor to bifurcate the creditor's claim into a secured por-
tion, based on the value of the collateral, and an unsecured portion,
based on the value of the creditor's claim exceeding the value of the
property. 113 Accordingly, if the property at issue retains value, this
value represents an allowed secured claim under the personal-liability
element.114
Like the collateral under Section 722, the allowed secured claim
under the personal-liability element is based on the fluctuating value
of the property. This value is calculated based on the fair-market
value of the property." 5 Therefore, the allowed secured claim under
Section 722-which is equivalent to the fair market value of the prop-
erty-refers to the allowed secured claim under the personal-liability
element. Consequently, the allowed secured claim relied on in Section
722 during redemption is not defined by state law, but rather, it is
defined by Section 506(a).
111. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (creating the lien liability element referencing the value of "a lien on
property in which the estate has an interest"); Id. § 506(d) (creating the voidance element refer-
encing the value "to the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor").
112. Id. § 506(a).
113. See, e.g., In re Beard, 45 F.3d 113, 120 (6th Cir. 1995).
114. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
115. SallieMae Servicing v. Banks, 271 B.R. 249, 255 (Bankr. W.D Va. 2001).
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A Chapter 7 analysis generally will not have any effect on a Chapter
13 claim because Chapter 7 involves liquidation, whereas Chapter 13
involves reorganization. In contrast to this generality is the argument
that a Chapter 7 analysis may provide guidance when a Chapter 7
debtor retains property through reaffirmation or redemption. How-
ever, the analysis that coincides with a reaffirmation agreement can-
not be applied to a Chapter 13 claim because a valid reaffirmation
agreement is a contract, which means it is removed from the parame-
ters of bankruptcy law. Furthermore, with respect to redemption
agreements, the secured status of a creditor's claim is clearly governed
by the personal-liability element of Section 506(a). Thus if the analysis
in a Chapter 13 case relies on a Chapter 7 redemption case, such a
case can only further support the position that Section 506 is a defini-
tional provision.
C. Tying the Flaws Together
In the majority of jurisdictions, courts have found the hanging para-
graph applies broadly, so these courts assert that Section 506 is en-
tirely restricted from applying to a 910-day claim. 116 However, under
this broad application, courts continue to find that 910-day claims re-
tain secured status because, under their flawed construction of Dew-
snup, state law defines secured status in bankruptcy claims.117 The
Dewsnup holding provides no basis for this assertion. Dewsnup estab-
lishes that the phrase "allowed secured claim" refers to a different
value under the personal-liability element and the voidance element
and ensures that the "pass-through rule" continues to preserve liens
beyond bankruptcy. Accordingly, it is clear that courts must continue
looking to Ron Pair for an understanding of the applicability of Sec-
tion 506; therefore, the secured status of a bankruptcy claim is defined
by Section 506.118
Additionally, Dewsnup involved a Chapter 7 claim, not a Chapter
13 claim. Chapter 7 cases are generally inapplicable to Chapter 13
claims.119 With respect to the hanging paragraph, however, the analy-
sis of a Chapter 7 redemption claim is comparable to the analysis of a
Chapter 13 claim. Nonetheless, even if a Chapter 7 redemption claim
is relied on as precedent for a Chapter 13 claim, the personal-liability
element of Section 506(a) governs the secured status of the creditor's
claim.
116. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
118. U.S. v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc. 489 U.S. 235, 238-39 (1989).
119. In re DeSimone, 21 B.R. 631, 632 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1982).
20091
372 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
If the jurisdictions that rely on the broad application of the hanging
paragraph would reconsider the true limitations of the Dewsnup hold-
ing, they would find that state law does not define the secured status
of a bankruptcy claim. Furthermore, in relying on Section 506 as a
definitional provision, these jurisdictions would find that under the
broad application of the hanging paragraph, Section 506 does not ap-
ply to a 910-day claim, and therefore, 910-day claims cannot retain
secured status.
IV. IN RE WHITE REVAMPS SECTION 506 BUT FAILS TO FULLY
UTILIZE THE HANGING PARAGRAPH
A. In re White Applies a Narrow Interpretation of the
Hanging Paragraph
In In re White, a car dealership financed the debtor's automobile
purchase with an $11,126.50 loan at 22.85% interest over sixty
months.120 The dealership then assigned its interest in, and all collat-
eral securing, the loan to the creditor. 121 Subsequently, the debtor
filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13.122 The debtor's confirmation
plan bifurcated the claim under Section 506, proposing to pay the se-
cured portion at the value of the vehicle, with eight percent interest
over the life of the plan.123 The creditor objected to this proposal and
asserted that bifurcation was no longer permissible.124 The creditor
relied on the common understanding of the hanging paragraph, which
provides secured status based on state law. 125 The creditor asserted
that it retained a secured claim based on the state law lien and that it
was entitled to the full 22.85% interest rate or, in the alternative, an
interest rate based on the Till v. SCS Credit Corp. plurality's "formula
approach. ' '126
The court disagreed with the creditor and the debtor. 27 The court
found the hanging paragraph had no bearing on the secured status of
120. In re White, 352 B.R. 633, 637 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2006).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 638.
125. White, 352 B.R. at 642.
126. Id. at 638; Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479 (2004) (explaining that the formula
approach defines the interest rate based on "the national prime rate, reported in the daily press,
which reflects the financial market's estimate of the amount a commercial bank should charge a
creditworthy commercial borrower to compensate for the opportunity costs of the loan, the risk
of inflation, and the relatively slight risk of default.").
127. White, 352 B.R. at 642-44.
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a 910-day claim.128 Therefore, the creditors did not have secured sta-
tus. 129 However, the court also found that the creditor's assertion that
this secured status derived from state law was inaccurate because se-
cured status was defined by Section 506.130
The court's analysis relied heavily on the specific language of the
hanging paragraph, which states in relevant part, "for purposes of par-
agraph (5), 11 U.S.C. § 506 shall not apply to a claim.' 131 Based on
this, the White court asserted that:
[T]he exclusion of § 506 is simply, and only, for purpose of deter-
mining if the plan, as proposed, satisfies the requirements of
§ 1325(a)(5) .... § 506 is therefore otherwise applicable to these
claims for all other purposes which would include the right to seek
adequate protection pending confirmation and relief from the
stay.132
The court then applied this analysis, displaying what-compared to
the majority view-can be interpreted as a highly limited hanging par-
agraph application. 133
The White court started its analysis with the assertion that Section
506 defines secured status, but also provides and imposes rights and
limitations on secured claims. 134 Specifically, Section 506(a) limits the
value of the allowed secured claim to the value of the collateral, while
Section 506(b) empowers the creditor to claim post petition inter-
est. 135 The court then asserted that Section 1325(a)(5) sets out the re-
quired treatment of a secured claim with respect to confirmation. 136 In
the absence of the hanging paragraph, under Section 1325(a)(5), a
creditor with a purchase-money security interest is entitled to the
value of the collateral and post-petition interest. 137 However, under
this limited interpretation, when the hanging paragraph applies, the
rights and limitations of Section 506 do not apply to the Section
1325(a)(5) claim. 138 Consequently, a 910-day creditor's claim is re-
lieved from the Section 506 limitation, which restricts the amount of
the claim to the value of the collateral; this claim is also prohibited
128. Id. at 644 ("The exclusion of § 506's application is for purposes of § 1325(a)(5). Section
506 is therefore otherwise applicable to these claims for all other purposes").
129. White, 352 B.R. at 644.
130. Id. at 642 ("the notion that § 506 is not definitional is clearly at odds with [Ron Pair]").
131. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2007).
132. White, 352 B.R. at 644.
133. See supra Part II for an analysis of the majority's broad application.
134. White, 352 B.R. at 645 (noting that § 506 grants rights and imposes limitations on secured
claims "vis a vis the confirmation process in chapter 13.").
135. Id. at 644.
136. Id. at 644-45.
137. Id. at 645.
138. Id.
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from receiving post petition interest. 139 Determining the actual value
of the claim under this narrow interpretation, however, requires fur-
ther analysis.
Under Section 502, the creditor is entitled to the amount due as of
the filing date. 140 Without Section 506, the debtor loses the bifurcation
privilege of Section 506(a). 141 Therefore, by negating the effect of Sec-
tion 506(a), the White court made the creditor entitled to "the entire
pre-petition, accrued and unpaid balance without reference to the
value of the collateral. ' 142 The next step is the calculation of interest.
According to White, in the absence of the hanging paragraph, Sec-
tion 506(b) creates a basis for a creditor's entitlement to post petition
interest based on the contract rate. 143 However, Section 506(b) is the
only basis for this post petition protection. 44 Therefore, under the
White analysis, as Section 506 rights are restricted, a creditor with a
910-day claim is not entitled to post petition interest. 145 In the absence
of post petition interest, the court created a valuation formula for the
910-day claim equal to the entire unpaid balance without entitlement
to the contract-based interest.146 Relying on Till, however, the court
noted this value was not representative of the amount due as of the
filing date, as required by Section 502.147
The Till Court established that because a reorganization plan per-
mits payment through installments, the value of the creditor's claim is
undermined as "the creditor cannot use the money right away, infla-
tion may cause the value of the dollar to decline before the debtor
pays, and there is always some risk of nonpayment.' 48 To ensure the
creditor received the allowed amount at the time of filing, the Till
Court granted interest based on the formula approach. 149 Therefore,
under Till, the creditor in White was entitled to the value of the collat-
eral plus interest based on the formula approach.'50
In White, the court emphasized that under Till, "an 'allowed secured
claim' under § 1325(a)(5) was synonymous with the value of the col-
139. White, 352 B.R. at 645.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 649.
143. Id. at 645.
144. White, 352 B.R. at 645. (noting that post petition interest is not included unless provided
by a provision other than Section 506. However, "[n]o such provision exists.").
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 650.
148. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 474 (2004).
149. Id. at 480-81. See supra note 128 for an explanation of the formula approach.
150. White, 352 B.R. at 650.
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lateral under § 506(c).' 15 1 The White court further asserted that after
the enactment of the hanging paragraph, 152 Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)
continues to protect the creditor's claim, but it now protects the value
of the entire claim, not just the value of the collateral. 153 Based on this
interpretation, the White court provided the creditor with the same
protection as that created by the Till analysis, which is interest based
on the formula approach.154 However, under White, the formula ap-
proach is applied to the value of the entire claim, rather than just the
value of the collateral. Therefore, the White court's analysis of the
hanging paragraph ultimately provides that a 910-day creditor is enti-
tled to the pre-petition balance plus interest calculated from the day
of filing under the formula.
B. White's Major Flaw: The Privilege of Section 1325(a)(5)
According to White, Section 506 generally defines secured status. 155
Furthermore, under the limited White interpretation of the hanging
paragraph, the specific rights and limitations of Section 506 do not
apply to the claim with respect to satisfaction of Section 1325(a)(5). 156
Therefore, in White, a 910-day creditor takes on secured status
through Section 506, and although certain rights are lost within Sec-
tion 1325(a)(5), the secured status of the claim is relied on to pull the
claim under Section 1325(a)(5). However, the White court fails to pro-
vide any justification for granting the privilege of Section 1325(a)(5)
to a 910-day creditor.
In pertinent part, Section 1325(a)(5) states, "except as provided in
subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if ... with respect to
each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan . . . "157 There-
fore, Section 1325(a)(5) is not universally applicable, but rather, the
initial step in applying this provision requires reliance on Section 506
to determine whether a claim is an "allowed secured claim." When a
court begins to analyze Section 1325(a)(5), the court must first con-
front Section 506. However, under any interpretation of the hanging
paragraph, narrow or broad, Section 506 is inapplicable to Section
1325(a)(5) with respect to a 910-day claim. Therefore, when the court
begins to analyze Section 1325(a)(5), it should immediately find that
151. Id. at 648.
152. It is important to draw attention to the fact that the Till decision took place in 2004, prior
to the 2005 enactment of the hanging paragraph.
153. White, 352 B.R. at 649.
154. Id. at 650.
155. Id. at 645.
156. Id. at 644.
157. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (2007) (emphasis added).
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the foundation for applying Section 1325(a)(5) to a 910-day claim, the
reliance on Section 506, is prohibited by the hanging paragraph. This
Section 506 foundation was necessary for the White court's analysis,
yet, under a proper reading of the hanging paragraph, this foundation
was absent.
C. White's Piecemeal Application of Section 506
After granting the privilege of Section 1325(a)(5) to the 910-day
creditor, the White court applied Section 506 within Section
1325(a)(5), arguably choosing provisions that are beneficial to the
creditor. As noted above, the court began by refusing to apply Section
506(a). 158 By refusing to apply this section, a 910-day creditor is enti-
tled to the full pre-petition balance of the claim, rather than the mere
bifurcated value of the collateral allocated to all other creditors under
Section 506(a). 159 Then the court looked to Till as it moved into inter-
est entitlement.
The court asserted that in Till, the allowed secured claim under Sec-
tion 1325(a)(5) was equal to the value of the collateral. 160 The court
also asserted that in applying Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), the Till Court
relied on the principles of Section 506(c) to provide the creditor with
interest at the formula rate, ultimately preserving the value of the col-
lateral during the debtor's repayment. 161 From there, the White court
moved into its own hanging paragraph analysis. According to White,
under the hanging paragraph, the 910-day creditor's allowed claim is
equal to the pre-petition balance, not the value of the collateral. 162
Thus, the court granted the 910-day creditor interest calculated at the
formula rate based on the pre-petition balance rather than the value
of the collateral. 163 The court stated that the basis for this interest is
the protection afforded under Section 1325(a)(5). 164 However, Section
1325(a)(5) does not directly provide this protection. Rather, just as
White provided in its interpretation of Till, the protection of formula
158. White, 352 B.R. at 645.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 649.
161. Id. (providing that "Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) has been interpreted to require that the
stream of payments provided by the plan equal the present value of the claim. Since an 'allowed
secured claim' under Section 1325(a)(5) was synonymous with the value of the collateral under
Section 506(c), the courts reasoned that interest was required to protect the creditor against the
risk of loss in collateral value during the pendency of the case.").
162. Id.
163. White, 352 B.R. at 650.
164. Id.
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rate interest derives from Section 506(c) after Section 1325(a)(5) sets
off that provision. 165
It is clear the White court did not fully commit to barring the appli-
cability of Section 506 under Section 1325(a)(5). The court begins by
allowing 910-day creditors their full pre-petition balance by barring
the application of Section 506(a); however, the court permits reliance
on Section 506(c) under Section 1325(a)(5) in order to provide a 910-
day creditor with interest calculated at the formula rate. By failing to
fully bar the applicability of Section 506 under Section 1325(a)(5), the
White court's analysis negated the potential behind the court's asser-
tion that Section 506 defines secured status.
D. The Effect of Eliminating White's Major Flaw
Section 1325 regulates the confirmation of a Chapter 13 reorganiza-
tion plan. Along with providing all creditors the ability to object to the
confirmation of a plan on the basis that the plan has not been pro-
posed in good faith,166 Section 1325 also provides explicit and unique
provisions for judicial consideration of secured and unsecured
claims. 167
Unsecured claims are regulated by Section 1325(a)(4) and (b)(1).
Pursuant to these provisions, an unsecured creditor is entitled to ob-
ject to confirmation based on two tests. The first test is referred to as
the "Best Interest of Creditors' Test,' 68 and is encompassed by Sec-
tion 1325(a)(4). 169 This provision establishes the basis for an un-
secured creditor's objection if the value to be distributed on each
unsecured claim is less than the amount that would have been paid on
the claim had the estate been liquidated under Chapter 7.170
The second test providing a basis for an unsecured creditor's objec-
tion is referred to as the "Disposable Income Test,"'171 and is encom-
passed by Section 1325(b)(1). 172 This provision creates the basis for an
unsecured creditor's objection if the plan fails to either: (1) propose to
165. Id. at 649.
166. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (2007) ("the court shall confirm a plan if... the plan has been
proposed in good faith").
167. See id. § 1325(a)(5) (defining confirmation requirements for "each allowed secured
claim"); id. § 1325(a)(4) (explaining the valuation requirements for "each allowed unsecured
claim"); id. § 1325(b)(1) (providing the plan requirements for "an allowed unsecured claim").
168. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 362-63.
169. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
170. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 363 (explaining the application of the "Best Interest of Cred-
itors' Test").
171. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 363.
172. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1).
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pay the objecting unsecured creditor's claim in full; or (2) assert that
"all of the debtor's projected disposable income for the three years
beginning with the first payment due under the plan will be applied to
make payments under the plan."'1 73
A secured creditor's objection is limited to Section 1325(a)(5).
Under Section 1325(a)(5), as long as the creditor has not accepted the
plan174 or surrendered the property securing the claim to the
debtor,175 the creditor can object based on insufficiency. The five req-
uisite elements of a sufficient plan are: (1) the plan permits the se-
cured creditor to retain the lien until the earlier of payment of the
underlying debt under nonbankruptcy law or discharge under 11
U.S.C. § 1328;176 (2) the plan provides that if the Chapter 13 claim is
dismissed or converted without completion of the plan, the lien will be
retained by the secured creditor; 77 (3) the value of the property to be
distributed under the plan is not less than the allowed amount of the
claim;178 (4) the plan provides for payments in equal monthly amounts
if it involves periodic payments;1 79 and (5) if the claim is secured by
personal property, the plan ensures payments sufficient to provide the
secured creditor adequate protection during the period of the plan.180
The confirmation plan is based on priority status; secured claims are
given favored treatment.181 Since Section 506 defines secured sta-
tus, 182 the debtor must consider the section when creating a reorgani-
zation plan. After composing the plan, "[t]he court is required to hold
a hearing on confirmation .... Any party in interest may object to the
confirmation." ' 83
During the confirmation hearing, Section 1325 acts as the basis for
confirmation, and Sections 1325(a) and (b) regulate the influential
value of a creditor's objection. For instance, if a secured creditor ob-
jects to the reorganization plan, but the five Section 1325(a)(5) neces-
sary elements of the plan are satisfied,184 the court has full authority
to confirm the plan over this creditor's objection. However, if the ele-
ments are not satisfied, the creditor's objection is highly influential
173. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 363.
174. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A).
175. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(C).
176. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I) (2007).
177. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(II) (2007).
178. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2007).
179. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(I).
180. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(II).
181. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 358, 368.
182. U.S. v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 238-39 (1989).
183. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 372.
184. See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
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because the court can only confirm the plan over the creditor's objec-
tion "if the plan payments are sufficient to preserve the present value
of the creditor's secured claim.' 185 From an unsecured creditor's
standpoint, upon objection, the court has full authority to confirm the
plan if both the Best Interest of Creditors' Test and the Disposable
Income Test are met.186 If the debtor fails to satisfy either test, the
unsecured creditor has an influential objection as the court is re-
stricted from confirming the plan over this objection.187 Additionally,
both secured and unsecured creditors facing a confirmation plan con-
structed in bad faith have an influential objection; under Section
1325(a)(3), the court may not confirm a plan unless it is proposed in
good faith.' 88
By overcoming White's flaw, it becomes apparent that a 910-day
claim is secured. However, with respect to Section 1325(a)(5), Section
506 does not apply and the 910-day creditor loses its secured status.
Section 1325(a)(5) provides a foundation strictly for secured creditor
objections. 89 As a 910-day creditor, although secured, does not retain
secured status under Section 1325(a)(5), this creditor is afforded no
influential value by presenting an objection under Section 1325(a)(5).
In the event that the debtor's confirmation plan fails to satisfy any or
all of the five necessary elements of Section 1325(a)(5), 190 the 910-day
creditor's objection carries no weight. Consequently, with respect to a
910-day claim, because of the hanging paragraph, Section 1325(a)(5)
creates no obligation for the debtor when creating the reorganization
plan.
It would seem that at this point, a 910-day creditor retains the mini-
mal protections afforded to an unsecured creditor through Sections
1325(a)(4) and (b). But, under the narrow interpretation of the hang-
ing paragraph, Section 506 is only prohibited with respect to Section
1325(a)(5). 191 Thus, with respect to any other provision under Section
1325, a 910-day claim retains secured status. By making an objection
under Section 1325(a)(4) or Section 1325(b), a 910-day creditor's ob-
jection receives no influential value because these provisions provide
185. Richard E. Coulson & Alvin C. Harrell, 1996 Consumer Bankruptcy Developments, 52
Bus. LAw. 1173, 1189 (1997).
186. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4), (b)(1) (2007).
187. HERBERT, supra note 20, at 363.
188. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).
189. Id. § 1325(a)(5) (2007) (this provision explicitly regulates "each allowed secured claim").
190. See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
191. In re White, 352 B.R. 633, 644 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2006) ("the exclusion of § 506 is simply,
and only, for purpose of determining if the plan, as proposed, satisfies the requirements of
§ 1325(a)(5) as to the claim.").
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a foundation for unsecured creditors. Accordingly, when creating the
reorganization plan, Section 1325(a)(4) and (b) create no obligation
for the debtor.
Under a sound analysis of the hanging paragraph, the 910-day credi-
tor is not granted protection via the objections explicitly afforded to
both secured and unsecured creditors under Section 1325(a). There-
fore, the 910-day creditor's ability to make an influential objection
should be limited to the use of Section 1325(a)(3), the good faith
requirement.
V. CONCLUSION
By revisiting Dewsnup, it becomes apparent that Section 506, and
not state law, defines the secured status of a bankruptcy claim. With
this understanding, the foundation for the majority's broad applica-
tion of the hanging paragraph deteriorates; accordingly, the narrow
application under White rightfully obtains a position of precedence.
However, even the White approach provides the creditor with the
flawed privilege of Section 1325(a)(5), which in turn fails to give true
effect to the potential limiting power contained within the hanging
paragraph. Ultimately, under a proper reading of the hanging para-
graph, the 910-day creditor's claim should be heavily restricted-good
faith is the only objection available to creditors under a Chapter 13
confirmation plan.
Such a literal approach to the hanging paragraph stands in clear
opposition to the bankruptcy policy of equality, as it would unreason-
ably restrain the fights of a 910-day creditor. However, with respect to
automobile lenders, statutory analysis has already strayed far from
equality. As noted by William Whitford, "[a]uto lenders comprise the
group of secured creditors whose rights have been most substantially
affected, mostly favorably, by the new law."'1 92 Therefore, the forego-
ing analysis characterizes the overall notion that although bankruptcy
law has strayed far from equality, (and more specifically, the hanging
paragraph has been construed in a way to favor automobile lenders)
under an in-depth, literal analysis, the hanging paragraph has the po-
tential to heavily restrain the rights of automobile lenders. With
equality, an established interest, as a backdrop, the legislature should
strongly reconsider the need for, and the propriety of, the hanging
paragraph.
192. William C. Whitford, A History of the Automobile Lender Provisions of BAPCPA, 2007
U. ILL. L. REV. 143, 144 (2007).
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